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Abstract
Digital rights management allows information owners to control the use and dissemination of electronic documents via a machine-
readable licence. This paper describes the design and implementation of a system for creating and enforcing licences containing
location constraints that can be used to restrict access to sensitive documents to a defined area. Documents can be loaded onto
a portable device and used in the approved areas, but cannot be used if the device moves to another area. Our contribution
includes a taxonomy for access control in the presence of requests to perform non-instantaneous controlled actions.
Key words: digital rights management, access control, location, HTTP-Enabled Location Delivery
1. Introduction
Electronic devices for accessing information are be-
coming increasingly mobile. There are, however, a num-
ber of scenarios in which the owner of some informa-
tion might want to restrict access to that information to
a particular geographical area. For example, companies
want to prevent sensitive trade secrets and intellectual
property from leaving the boundaries of their offices,
and publishing houses want to maximise the value of
their publications in different geographic markets.
Over the past decade, digital rights management
(“DRM”) has become an important technology in the
protection of copyrighted multimedia works, sensitive
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corporate information and private data. DRM allows
information owners to control the use and dissemina-
tion of electronic files via a machine-readable licence
that sets out the terms and conditions under which a
file can be used.
A licence for a file sets outs who may access the file,
what they may do with it, and under what conditions
they may do it. In this paper, we are principally con-
cerned with licences that restrict the use of files to a par-
ticular geographical area, such as the physical premises
of an organisation or a particular legal jurisdiction. We
will give an overview of digital rights management and
location constraints in Section 3.
Enforcing location-based access control policies re-
quires the access control enforcement point to be aware
of the movement of a mobile device during the ex-
ercise of a controlled action. We introduce a taxon-
omy for access control systems in the presence of non-
instantaneous actions in Section 4.
We then present our implementation of a location-
aware digital rights management system in Section 5.
Our implementation is based on the MPEG-21 Intel-
lectual Property Management and Protection (“IPMP”)
Components [1] and supports non-instantaneous “play”
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actions by polling a trusted location information server
using the HTTP-Enabled Location Delivery (“HELD”)
protocol [2]. The digital rights management approach
allows for location constraints to be imposed on elec-
tronic files in a straightforward and transparent fashion,
and use of the HELD protocol allows our system to
take advantage of future developments in location de-
termination technology without the need for end users
to upgrade their devices.
Finally, Section 6 presents and evaluation of our pro-
totype and discusses the issues facing the deployment
of a security system of this kind.
2. Related Work
Numerous systems have been proposed for determin-
ing or verifying the location of a mobile device. For
access control decisions, we require the location of a
mobile device to be verified such that a dishonest user
cannot fake his or her location. Many such systems have
been proposed, based on WiFi networks [3–11], GPS
[8,12–16], cellular telephone networks [13,15,17–19],
RFID [20] and other sensor networks [21–23].
Each of these systems has a number of advantages
and disadvantages relative to other systems. WiFi net-
works, for example, can provide very high accuracy in
indoor environments with existing networks, while cel-
lular telephone networks provide lower accuracy but
higher existing coverage in outdoor areas. Furthermore,
the location technologies available to be used may vary
according the nature of the devices to be located.
In this paper, we are not concerned with the particular
method by which a device is located. We assume that we
have a trusted location provider able to securely locate a
device. The location provider may use any method that
it deems appropriate for the nature of the area and the
device to be located, without affecting the DRM system
discussed in this paper.
Many authors have also proposed models for access
control policies that include rules about location or other
context information [24–34], and both of most promi-
nent languages used for writing digital rights manage-
ment licences – the Extensible RightsMarkup Language
(“XrML”) [35] and the Open Digital Rights Language
[36] – support clauses that constrain the use of a file to
a particular location.
Mundt [16] proposes a DRM system in which a de-
vice checks location constraints using an on-board GPS-
like receiver. In our prototype, the location of the ter-
minal is determined by an off-board location provider
that may use any technology deemed to be appropriate.
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Fig. 1. The components of a digital rights management system.
Al-Muhtadi, et al. [37] propose a location-aware ac-
cess control system in which sensitive computer files
are encrypted with a secret key that is accessible only
in the region in which the files are to be accessed. This
approach has some similarities to ours, in which a se-
cret key is only made available if the conditions of a
licence are satisfied. Our prototype, however, separates
the expression of an access control policy from its en-
forcement, which allows arbitrarily expressive policies
to be supported in a straightforward and modular way.
Tolone, et al. [27] point out the need for context-
based access control systems to account for actions that
take a non-zero time to complete, since the context that
enabled an action to begin may change prior to the
action being completed. The only systems of which we
are aware that implement access control of this sort are
those of Lee, et al. [38] and White, et al. [39], which
both implement what we will call the “event-based”
model. We will consider other methods of enforcement
and develop a taxonomy for them in Section 4.
3. Digital Rights Management
Figure 1 shows our reference model for a DRM sys-
tem. Information is created by a provider, and transmit-
ted in a protected (for example, encrypted) form to a
user via some distribution channel. In order to access
the protected data, the user must obtain a licence from
the licence issuer.
Licences are written in a machine-readable rights ex-
pression language that sets out the terms of use of the
data and the information required to access the pro-
tected content. We use the MPEG Rights Expression
Language [40] in this paper.
The fundamental security requirement for a DRM
system is that the hardware and/or software used to
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Fig. 2. The components of a terminal.
access protected data be guaranteed by its manufacturer
to behave in accordance with licences. For the purposes
of this paper, a terminal is an abstract single-user player,
editor, or similar that may be implemented as a hardware
device, a software application or combination of the
two.
Figure 2 shows our reference model for a terminal.
When a user wishes to perform some particular action
on a particular item of data, the decision point checks
that the user possesses a licence that permits that action.
It further checks that the licence has been signed by a
recognised licence issuer, and that any conditions asso-
ciated with the permission are satisfied. If a suitable li-
cence does not exist, or the conditions are not satisfied,
the decision point will refuse to carry out the operation.
Otherwise, the enforcement point will be permitted to
retrieve the data key, and the renderer enabled to carry
out the desired operation.
3.1. Location Constraints
In general, the human user of a terminal, the enforce-
ment point, the decision point and the renderer may
be separated by arbitrarily large distances – speakers
may be connected to a music player via an arbitrarily
long cable, for example, or someone may view a screen
through a telescope. For ease of exposition of this paper,
we assume that the renderer, decision point and enforce-
ment point all are contained within a monolithic termi-
nal whose components cannot be separated and whose
location can be securely determined, such as a laptop
computer or mobile telephone. It is possible, however,
to apply our system to non-monolithic terminals so long
as the decision point is able to determine the location
of renderer as distinguished from itself, as in [41].
Technologies for locating devices have varying de-
grees of accuracy, with errors ranging from less than a
metre for special-purpose wireless networks up to hun-
dreds of metres or more for GSM telephone networks.
Inaccuracies in location information may cause loca-
tion conditions to be enforced incorrectly by the access
control system: a user might be either incorrectly given
permission to perform an action if his or her terminal
is incorrectly located within a permitted area, or might
be incorrectly refused permission if his or her terminal
is incorrectly located outside the permitted area.
In the present paper, we assume that the inaccuracy
in a location measurement is insignificant compared to
the distance over which a device would need to travel
in order to defeat the system. For example, an error
of a few metres seems acceptable if leaking company
information to a competitor requires travelling to an
office several kilometres away. Some other suggestions
for handling inaccuracy in location measurements for
access control can be found in [34].
4. Access Control for Non-Instantaneous Actions
In traditional access control, we tend to think of ac-
tions as being instantaneous. For example, a process is
either permitted to open a file for reading, or it is not;
there is no option to control the period of time (for ex-
ample) for which the file may be open. Access control
systems with continuing actions appear to have inspired
interest only very recently [27,38,39].
In a context-aware access control system, it may be
possible to circumvent an instantaneous access control
decision by initiating an action while in an approved
context, then moving to an unapproved context without
completing the action. For example, a dishonest em-
ployee might open a document on a laptop computer
while in a company’s offices, then take the computer to
a competitor’s office without closing the document.
We define the precision of a non-instantaneous access
control system as the time taken for an access control
decision to be updated after a context change occurs
affecting that decision. In general, there is a trade-off
between the precision of a system and the cost of imple-
menting it. We will discuss the trade-offs for individual
mechanisms below.
Note that the methods listed below are not mutually
exclusive: it is possible to implement a system in which
a device can both poll the context manager and react to
events sent to it by the context manager, for example,
or in which starting a new action forces an otherwise
poll-based system to obtain new context information.
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4.1. Trivial Models
The trivial option is to simply allow an action to
continue indefinitely once it has been approved, regard-
less of any changes in context. Obviously this option is
only appropriate where the value of the protected data
is ephemeral.
4.2. Event-Based Models
The systems proposed by Lee, et al. [38] and White,
et al. [39] are examples of event-based systems in which
some context manager is able to notify the access con-
trol system when an environment condition ceases to
be true. For Lee, et al. and White, et al., notification is
provided by an existing ubiquitous computing network,
which may be expensive to implement if it does not ex-
ist already.
Event-based systems are very precise, but are obvi-
ously susceptible to tampering with the channel that
communicates events to the access control decision
point. If an attacker is able to mount a denial-of-service
attack on the channel, the access control decision point
may not receive an event indicating that an access
control decision must be reversed.
4.3. Poll-Based Models
The prototype described in this paper is an exam-
ple of a poll-based system in which the access control
decision point requests updated context information at
regular intervals. Polling can resist denial-of-service at-
tacks by reversing an access control decision if context
information cannot be obtained.
Poll-based systems are straightforward to implement,
and precision can be traded against computational cost
by varying the interval at which new context information
is requested. We chose polling for our system due to
the ease with which an existing location service could
be incorporated into our application without modifying
the existing infrastructure, and because it is easy for the
licence issuer to make a good estimate of the required
polling frequency by considering the size of the area
described by a location constraint.
4.4. Exclusion-Based Models
A user can be given incentive to cease performing
an action by excluding him or her from performing fur-
ther actions until the first action is stopped. This forces
context-dependent conditions to re-checked every time
the user requests to perform an action.
Exclusion-based systems obviously have low preci-
sion, and are only effective if principals have an incen-
tive to constantly perform new actions. However, they
can be implemented with very little infrastructure and
eliminate the need for the access control decision point
to be in constant contact with the context manager.
4.5. Prevention-Based Models
Rather than reverse an access control decision should
some relevent context change, an access control system
may be able to prevent context from changing by for-
bidding any actions that would cause an unacceptable
change in context. For example, upon opening a docu-
ment that may only be read in a given room, the access
control system may cause the door to the room to lock
until the document is closed.
In many applications, prevention-based systems may
be prohibitively expensive, socially unacceptable or
simply impossible. Where practical, however, such sys-
tems can provide very high precision and security, and
may be useful in small-scale high-security scenarios.
5. Location-based DRM Prototype
We developed a prototype location-based DRM sys-
tem called IPLocDRM (for “Internet Protocol Location
DRM”). IPLocDRM allows information providers to
cryptographically protect their files in such a way as to
permit access only when the renderer is located within a
particular location. The DRM system on which IPLoc-
DRM is based supports conditions other than location,
but we will only discuss the location condition in this
paper.
5.1. DRM Implementation
The IPLocDRM prototype is based on the Smart In-
ternet Technology Digital Rights Management system
(“SITDRM”) [42], a DRM framework based on the
MPEG-21 Multimedia Framework [43] developed by
the Co-operative Research Centre for Smart Internet
Technology, Australia.
The MPEG-21 Multimedia Framework is centred on
the notion of a digital item, which represents a hierar-
chical collection of multimedia objects using the Digital
Item Declaration Language (“DIDL”). The IPMP Com-
ponents define a mechanism by which vendor-specific
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IPMP tools may be associated with governed (rights-
managed) elements. IPMP tools are plug-ins that imple-
ment particular decryption, key management and other
algorithms. IPLocDRM adds a location-aware IPMP
tool that interprets location constraints and retrieves lo-
cation information.
Licences are written using the MPEG Rights Expres-
sion Language (“MPEG REL”). Each licence contains a
collection of grants issued by some licence issuer. Each
grant awards some right over some specified resource to
a specified principal, that is, user of a resource. Grants
may be subject to conditions, such that the right con-
tained in the grant cannot be exercised unless the con-
dition is satisfied. We will describe the licences used in
our prototype in Section 5.3.
IPLocDRM’s cryptographic architecture is similar to
that used by other DRM systems. Every trusted termi-
nal T is assumed to possess a public keyKT whose au-
thenticity can be verified using some public key infras-
tructure. The corresponding private key K¯T is known
only to the terminal; in particular, it is not known to the
human user of the terminal.
Every governed resource x is encrypted with a unique
symmetric resource key kx. Any licence that grants per-
mission to access a resource x on a terminal T must
contain kx encrypted byKT , and be digitally signed by
the owner of x. In this way, only T is able to extract
kx and therefore x; and T will only accept licences that
were issued by the owner of x. Since T is trusted to
comply with the conditions imposed by the grant, only
the uses permitted by the grant are possible.
5.2. IPLocDRM Architecture
The IPLocDRM prototype adapts the existing SIT-
DRM architecture, shown in Figure 3. The high-level
components are separated logically and communicate
via a network, using web services or (in the case of lo-
cation information) using the HTTP-Enabled Locaton
Delivery (“HELD”) protocol [2].
Location information is provided by a Location Infor-
mation Server (“LIS”) - a device capable of determin-
ing the location of an IP-enabled device within its net-
work of influence, and respond to location requests us-
ing HELD. Our prototype uses the current open source
LIS under development by Andrew Corporation, which
is capable of providing location within a wired IP net-
work [44].
The IPLocDRM Client (shown in Figure 4) is a
location-aware Java GUI application used by both the
information provider and licence issuer to create and
submit documents to the SITDRM document server
The document server then serves these documents and
licences in response to requests from terminals.
When the user (logged into a trusted terminal) at-
tempts to perform an action associated with a location
condition, our IPMP tool requests the terminal’s current
location from the LIS. If the location condition is satis-
fied, access is granted and a periodic location checking
process is initiated to enforce this condition over an in-
definite amount of time.
5.3. The Territory Condition
MPEG REL uses the Territory condition to bind
a grant to a geographic region. An example similar to
the licences used in our prototype is shown in Figure 5.
This licence permits a principal that possesses a pri-
vate key corresponding to a given public key (omitted
for brevity) to “play” (view) the document urn:uow:
iploc:doc1 if his or her device is located at 1 Crown
St in Wollongong, Australia.
The prototype uses the civic location (that is, street
address) format due to the ease with which it can be de-
fined by a licence issuer. This format, however, may lack
granularity for certain applications, such as restricting
use in non-urban regions such as parks and wilderness.
The HELD protocol also supports a geodetic (that is,
longitude and latitude) format that may be more appro-
priate in these scenarios.
Civic locations are compared by requiring all of the
non-empty fields of the condition to match the corre-
sponding fields returned by the location provider. This
allows a match to be made if the location provider
supplies information that is more specific than that in
the licence. Geodetic locations can be compared using
straightforward geometric methods.
A Territory condition is composed of a single
LocationProvider element defining an external
service from which to request location information, and
one or more LocationInfo elements describing a
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Fig. 4. IPLocDRM: (a) protecting a document; (b) issuing a licence; and (c) adding a Territory condition.
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<r:license>
<r:grant>
<r:keyHolder>
<r:info>
<dsig:KeyValue>
<dsig:RSAKeyValue>
...
</dsig:RSAKeyValue>
</dsig:KeyValue>
</r:info>
</r:keyHolder>
<mx:play/>
<mx:diReference>
<mx:identifier>
urn:uow:iploc:doc1
</mx:identifier>
</mx:diReference>
<sx:territory>
<sx:LocationProvider>
<sx:Handler>
au.edu.uow.iploc.held.HeldClient
</sx:Handler>
<sx:Url>
https://lis.informatics.uow.edu.au
</sx:Url>
</sx:LocationProvider>
<sx:LocationInfo>
<sx:PollFrequency>
20000
</sx:PollFrequency>
<sx:CivicLocation>
<cl:country>AU</cl:country>
<cl:A1>NSW</cl:A1>
<cl:A3>Wollongong</cl:A3>
<cl:A6>Crown</cl:A6>
<cl:HNO>1</cl:HNO>
<cl:PC>2500</cl:PC>
</sx:CivicLocation>
</sx:LocationInfo>
</sx:territory>
<r:grant>
</r:license>
Fig. 5. An MPEG REL licence binding playback to a particular
location.
location and the frequency with which the condition
should be checked. This allows the licence issuer to
specify a location provider that he or she trusts.
For convenience, locations are described using the
Presence Information Data Format Location Object
(“PIDF-LO”) format used by HELD rather than the
similar format used in the MPEG REL specification.
Both formats only allow locations to be specified in
a positive fashion in that they specify where a device
must be rather than where it must not be. Negative con-
ditions such as “playing is permitted if the principal is
not located in a moving vehicle” could be implemented
using a “not” operator, but our prototype does not yet
support this.
Binding the poll frequency to the defined location
has two main advantages. Firstly, our solution does not
have to explicitly acknowledge any difference in scale
between locations. Furthermore, by specifying the poll
frequency at the time of licence creation, the licence
issuer has control over the specific value. When the li-
cence is created, a decision can be made on an appropri-
ate timing interval based on a number of factors includ-
ing the total area of the restricted region, the sensitiv-
ity of the information being accessed, and any specific
organisational information or security polices.
6. IPLocDRM Evaluation
6.1. Channel Security and Trust
Since the accuracy of location information is critical
to enforcing a grant, it is necessary to authenticate the
identity of the LIS and ensure the integrity of the loca-
tion information received. The HELD protocol provides
integrity and authentication of location information us-
ing the Transport Layer Security (“TLS”) protocol [45],
and this method is employed by IPLocDRM.
The integrity of the distribution channels used to
transmit a governed resource and its corresponding li-
cence is less critical to the security of the system. As de-
scribed in Section 5.1, a governed resource is protected
by a unique symmetric key which is in turn protected
by the terminal’s public key and stored in the licence.
Assuming that the terminal is trusted, we do not require
trusted distribution channels.
IPLocDRM allows the licence issuer to verify the
trustworthiness of the LIS, while the terminal must ver-
ify its identity at run-time. As mentioned in Section 5.3,
the licence issuer supplies the URL of a LIS deemed
to provided accurate location information by organisa-
tional process or policy outside the scope of IPLoc-
DRM. When the terminal uses TLS to contact the LIS,
a decision must still be made whether to accept the pre-
sented certificate (and hence the LIS’s identity) or not.
It should be noted that the HELD protocol can deter-
mine the location of a trusted terminal, but not that of
its user. Terminals can, however, provide some assur-
ance of the location of their users by rejecting access to
location sensitive information if a user is logged in via
some remote log-in service.
6.2. Location Mechanism
Using an off-board location provider for IPLocDRM
allows the system to scale across multiple networks,
potentially using different access technologies. So long
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as the terminal is in a network covered by the LIS that
is able to provide location with an accuracy acceptable
to the licence issuer, the system will work, and IPLoc-
DRM can operate independently of the network that the
terminal is in without modification.
IPLocDRM uses polling to ensure that an action is
halted should a Territory condition cease to be sat-
isfied. It is up to the creator of a licence to determine
the frequency with which polls will be conducted, such
that a user cannot make sensitive changes to his or her
location between poll events. Intuitively, we expect li-
cence creators to choose lower frequencies for larger
areas, and higher frequencies for smaller areas, since it
would take a user a longer time to move from one large
area to another (e.g. from city to city) as compared to
small areas (such as buildings).
By this fact, we note that a poll-based model for
access control decisions is more appropriate when used
with medium to large restricted regions – such as an
entire office building. Restricting access to a smaller
scale region (for example, individual rooms within an
office) might require a very high poll rate and still lead
to imprecise access control decisions.
An event-based model, as described in Section 4.2,
provides more precise access control for smaller re-
gions by detecting when the user moves and notifying
the access control system. Unfortunately, implementing
an event-based model using the HELD protocol is dif-
ficult, as all forms of HELD requests provide location
only when executed. Implementing an event-based (or
prevention-based) model requires an additional context-
aware network to be developed and deployed, possibly
at very high expense.
7. Summary
IPLocDRM shows how digital rights management
can be used to restrict access to electronic files to a
particular location. IPLocDRM’s licence interpreter is
independent of the form of location determination in
use, and allows licence issuers to specify which loca-
tion providers they trust to deliver accurate and reliable
location information using the HTTP-Enabled Location
Delivery protocol.
IPLocDRM uses a simple polling mechanism to pre-
vent users from defeating the system by opening docu-
ments in a permitted location, then moving their view-
ing device to an unpermitted location without closing
the device. Other mechanisms are possible, however,
and we have proposed a taxonomy for access control in
the presence of non-instantaneous actions.
The digital rights management approach allows new
conditions to be added to an access control policy in a
straightforward way, and allows all policy information
to be gathered and processed by a single component.
This allows the data protection system to be designed
in a modular and consistent fashion.
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